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Abstract 
Multinational companies from emerging economies are becoming significant players in the 
globalized world economy. As the volume of foreign direct investment from emerging 
economies is rising, and emerging multinationals increasingly seek access to markets and 
assets in advanced developed economies, the host governments feel the need to define their 
responses and policies. The European Union is emerging as an important destination for 
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). The 
paper looks at the strategic stance of European national investment promotion agencies 
(IPAs) towards emerging multinationals from BRIC. It inventorizes promotion efforts of 
these IPAs tailored to the BRIC companies, such as specifically customized information 
provision on IPA websites and the presence of IPA representative offices in BRIC. On the 
basis of comparative analysis, it offers reflections on the challenges and opportunities 
presented by emerging multinationals to European countries. 
Keywords: investment promotion, emerging economies, multinational companies, Europe  
JEL: F21, F23, F59, O52 
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1. Introduction 
Emerging economies of Asia and Latin America are becoming a distinctive phenomenon of 
the global economy at the end of the 20th century – beginning of the 21st. Particularly, Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, jointly abbreviated as BRIC, are gaining economic strength. 
According to various estimates, the BRIC economies have potentials to overtake G7 
economies in terms of aggregated GDP in a couple of decades. In the path-breaking 
development, many of emerging economies relied on foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
activities of foreign multinational companies that connected these countries to the global 
economy. At the beginning of the 21st century, however, a new trend is taking shape. 
Emerging economies become home to a number of fast-growing internationalising 
companies. In the early stages of their development these ‘emerging multinationals’ have 
targeted neighbouring economies, with mainly the same level of economic development as 
their home countries. Since recently however the emerging multinationals are increasingly 
looking at the advanced Triadic markets. 
While the body of extant academic and practitioner-oriented literature on emerging 
multinationals is growing and burgeoning, studies on responses and policies of host 
governments, specifically by investment promotion agencies (IPAs) in the European Union 
(EU) are still scarce. Although the BRIC’s FDI stock in Europe is modest, the BRIC 
multinationals’ role is Europe is rising and becoming more pronounced. The Russian oil and 
gas giant Gazprom is getting a grip on the energy systems of many European countries, 
India’s Tata Steel and ArcelorMittal dominate in the European steel industry, and the Chinese 
have ambitions to acquire massively crisis-hit European technological companies (WSJ 
2011). Apart from such high-profile companies and deals, there are a large number of small- 
and medium-sized firms established in Europe and owned by the BRIC nationals.  
This topic is full of controversies. Outward FDI from emerging economies may bring 
traditional benefits such capital and new jobs. However, due to a less advanced technological 
profile of many emerging multinationals, their subsidiaries may have less potential for 
technological and knowledge spillovers to domestic firms of host economies. Moreover, the 
question remains whether the emerging multinationals are regular economic agents or tools of 
foreign policy of home governments. At the same time, the global economic crisis that 
erupted in 2008 and the on-going Eurocrisis add to global risk and uncertainty and reduce 
economic growth in Europe to near-zero. As European and U.S. multinational companies put 
most investment projects on halt, and hence less FDI is expected from traditional economic 
poles, Many European countries are increasingly looking eastwards at emerging economies, 
the BRIC countries in particular. 
Following this reasoning, the objective of this paper is to examine, compare and analyse 
current promotion efforts of the national IPAs of 27 EU member-states and several other 
European non-EU countries. The main source of data is the official IPAs websites, supported 
by secondary data from various sources. The focus is purely on investment promotion 
campaigns of IPAs, established by the respective public authorities. Thus we explicitly 
exclude various forms of bilateral investment and trade promotion commissions. Next, 
because IPAs normally are engaged with new, greenfield, investment projects, any sort of 
facilitation of merger and acquisition (M&A) deals is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the context and provides a theoretical 
background and derives research propositions. Section 3 describes data and methodology and 
presents findings. Section 4 offers synthesis of findings and analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical Background 
The section starts with an introduction to FDI promotion as a distinctive aspect of public 
policy. Next, we look at emerging multinationals, specifically at their presence in Europe. 
Lastly, we synthesis insights from these two domains and elaborate on the promotion of FDI 
from emerging markets, i.e. attraction of operations of emerging multinationals to host 
economies. 
 
2.1. Foreign direct investment promotion 
FDI is one of the main drivers of contemporary global economy and a key input in economic 
growth. It implies strong economic interdependence between nations and contributes to ever 
increasing globalization. According to UNCTAD (2012), global FDI flows in 2011 achieved 
$1.5 trillion, exceeded the pre-crisis average, however still some 23 per cent below their 2007 
peak. The benefits of FDI as argued by the academic literature and policymakers alike 
include capital investment, employment opportunities, generation of tax revenues and higher 
exports. More importantly, the role of FDI as a vehicle transferring intangible competences 
such as technology and know-how is widely acknowledged (Blomström and Kokko 1998). 
As noted by Stiglitz (2000: 1076), The argument for foreign direct investment … is 
compelling. Such investment brings with it not only resources, but also technology, access to 
markets, and (hopefully) valuable training, an improvement in human capital. Foreign direct 
investment is also not as volatile – and therefore as disruptive – as the short-term flows that 
can rush into a country and, just as precipitously, rush out. 
The global competition amongst countries for attracting FDI has become acute. Many nations 
perceive higher and better inward FDI stock as a first-class ticket to globalization; and 
foreign multinational companies have been welcomed even in sectors previously exclusively 
reserved to the host government and domestic firms. Not only did the governments liberalize 
their investment framework and requirements, they started actively promoting their countries 
as destinations for inward FDI (Kobrin 2005). Such FDI promotion is based on the 
justification of policy intervention in the presence of a market failure. The main one is the 
asymmetric information. Multinational companies do not possess perfect information about 
all investment opportunities worldwide, and hence executives of these companies tend to 
make biased decisions. Many multinational companies consider only a small number of 
potential locations for their FDI projects, while most countries are not even taken into 
consideration as these places are not on their ‘corporate maps’ (IFC 1997). This may not be 
that critical for the largest corporations that can hire experts and specialized agencies for the 
analysis of investment opportunities, but it becomes a problem for medium-sized 
multinationals and small- and medium enterprises making their first international steps. 
Information asymmetry is linked to the classic Uppsala model by Johanson and Vahlne 
(1977) holding that a firm’s international activities relate directly to psychic distance, and that 
further international expansion progresses into markets with successively greater psychic 
distance. The concept of psychic distance, first formulated by Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul 
(1973), includes factors preventing or disturbing the flow of information between potential or 
actual suppliers and customers. These factors are associated with country-based diversities 
and dissimilarities, such as (1) linguistic differences and translation difficulty; (2) cultural 
factors – societal norms, level of individualism or collectivism, values and customs; (3) 
economic situation – existing trading links, infrastructure, local conditions, competition and 
investor confidence; (4) political and legal system – government stability and risks, import 
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tariffs, legal protection and taxation. One may argue that FDI promotion aspires to cover the 
psychic distance between the home and host countries in the eyes of foreign investors. 
The central agents in FDI promotion in most countries are so-called investment promotion 
agencies (IPAs). As Sauvant (2012: 1) puts it, national FDI screening agencies were 
replaced by investment promotion agencies – red carpets replaced red tape. Nowadays, IPAs 
are set up not only at the national level, but increasingly also at the level of regions or even 
cities. First IPAs started to emerge in the early 1990s; and in 1995, the World Association of 
Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) was established in Geneva. Presently, WAIPA 
unites 244 national and sub-national agencies from 162 different countries. 
International organizations – WAIPA, UNCTAD and OECD – have produced numerous 
manuals, toolkits and guidelines of better practices of investment promotion. A great body of 
academic literature has been devoted to the role of IPAs and their functions (Young et al. 
1994, IFC 1997, Loewendahl 2001, Wells and Wint 2001, Zanatta et al. 2006, Guimón and 
Filippov 2012). As it is generally acknowledged, the scope of IPA’s work may include 
information provision (about the country’s business climate, geopolitical location, investment 
incentives and taxation, labour market conditions and averages wages, infrastructure), 
competitive positioning, targeting strategy, image building and marketing, investment 
services and investor facilitation, matching foreign investors with domestic firms, as well as 
policy advocacy. One of the key tasks delegated to IPAs is to offer and negotiate financial 
and non-financial investment incentives granted to foreign investors. The topic whether 
investment incentives positively affect investment project, or foreign company would invest 
anyway and the incentives are government’s income forgone is greatly debatable though 
(Morisset and Pirnia 1999). 
Active investment promotion implies activities in various fields, which can be done either 
with or without specific targets. It is based on the assumption that not types of inward FDI 
have the same impact on the host economy, i.e. FDI in specific sectors, functions and 
locations potentially bring more benefit. Enderwick (2005) suggested the targets for FDI 
promotion be defined according to four criteria: (1) the size of the firm; (2) industry (higher 
value-added industry is preferred to lower valued-added one); (3) business functions of an 
affiliate (higher value added functions are preferred to lower value added ones); (4) form of 
entry mode (greenfield versus mergers and acquisitions).  
Building upon this idea of selective FDI promotion, Guimón and Filippov (2012) introduce 
the distinction between quantitative and qualitative promotion. Quantitative FDI promotion 
aims to increase FDI inflows in response to short-term shortages of capital (balance of 
payments) and/or jobs (unemployment). In its turn, qualitative FDI promotion aims at 
attraction of FDI which can be beneficial for innovativeness of the host economy and have 
prospects of knowledge spillovers. Advanced economies welcomes ‘premium’ FDI in 
specific business functions (BPO, R&D, etc.) and/or specific industrial sectors (IT, biotech, 
nanotech, etc.). And many less advanced (or developing) countries view FDI as an engine for 
‘upgrading through innovation’ (Ernst 2008, Mytelka and Barclay 2004, Santangelo 2005). In 
other words, quantitative promotion is about ‘more’ FDI, while quantitative promotion is 
about ‘better’ FDI. 
 
2.2. Multinationals companies and FDI from emerging economies in Europe 
Gammeltoft (2008) distinguishes three waves of outward FDI from developing and transition 
(emerging economies). The first wave took place in the 1960s to mid-1980s and was 
exemplified by Latin American companies investing mainly in other developing countries in 
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the same region. The second wave occurred from the mid-1980s to 1990s and was driven 
mainly by companies of the Asian tigers internationalising both into developing countries and 
more distant developed economies. The third wave that started in the 1990s represents a more 
geographically diverse set of countries. Next to Asia, we are witnessing resurgence of Latin 
America and inclusion of Russia and South Africa. This third wave has attracted a great deal 
of scholarly interest. The body of academic literature on this topic has been grown 
tremendously over the recent years. Apart from a multitude of regular academic articles and 
books (Goldstein 2007, Sauvant 2008, Ramamurti and Singh 2009), several special journal 
issues have been published. Among them are special issues of International Journal of 
Technological Learning, Innovation and Development (2013, Vol. 6, Iss. 2), European 
Management Journal (2012, Vol. 30, Iss. 3), Journal of World Business (2012, Vol. 47, 
Iss. 1), Journal of International Management (2010, Vol. 16, Iss. 2), International Journal of 
Emerging Markets (2010, Vol. 5, Iss. 3-4) and Industrial and Corporate Change (2009, Vol. 
18, Iss. 2). 
It has been debated whether motivation of FDI from emerging economies can be fully 
explained by the traditional factors driving investments of western multinationals only. 
Scholars have called to reconsider the classic theory of firm internationalization (Child and 
Rodrigues 2005, Dunning 2006, Mathews 2006, Buckley et al. 2007). The theory of (western) 
multinational companies explain their internationalization by ‘ownership advantages’, such as 
brand and trademark, proprietary technology and production technique, entrepreneurial skills 
and managerial know-how, returns to scale and production efficiency. In contrast, many 
emerging multinationals are at the early stages of their development. Many of them do enjoy 
advantages at home in a form of a pool of cheap labour, access to natural resources, or 
support of the home government, but they also have disadvantages such as a lack of globally 
competitive proprietary technology, weak brands, poor managerial system and corporate 
governance.  
It is suggested that internationalization of emerging multinationals is driven by ‘ownership 
disadvantages’ that can be overcome through acquisition of assets in developed markets and 
engagement in global competition. Rui and Yip (2008) develop a strategic intent perspective 
to analyse the foreign acquisitions made by Chinese firms. These companies strategically use 
cross-border acquisitions to acquire strategic capabilities enabling them to offset competitive 
disadvantages and leverage their unique ownership advantages. Luo and Tung (2007) refer to 
this aggressive, risk-taking acquisition of critical assets from mature multinationals as a 
‘springboard strategy’. Ramamurti (2012) warns that western firms tend to underestimate the 
competitive advantages emerging multinationals use to win at home and abroad. This, indeed, 
accentuates the fact that many emerging multinationals have overgrown their regional 
ambitions of internationalization into neighbouring economies, and they are increasingly 
aspiring for advanced markets.  
Europe, as one of the Triadic poles, represents a very attractive market for emerging 
multinationals in terms of its technological sophistication and a unified market of 500 million 
consumers. Market-seeking motives are one of the main drivers for FDI of BRIC companies, 
as argued by Holtbrügge and Kreppel (2012). Despite the large home populations, BRIC 
companies face a low per capita GDP home market. For further expansion they seek growth 
opportunities outside their home markets, and not in neighbouring developing countries, but 
in large and prosperous developed economies, more attractive in terms of market size and 
market potential (Luo and Tung 2007). Next to it, strategic asset-seeking motive is valid too. 
A number of studies have appeared in the recent years that address the strategies, 
motivations, geography and operations of emerging multinationals in Europe. Among them, 
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the main focus has been on Chinese (and Indian) companies. Milelli et al. (2010) analysed the 
characteristics of Chinese and Indian firms in Europe. Knoerich (2011), Hay and Milelli 
(2011) and Shi et al. (2010) examined Chinese FDI in Europe, on the basis of macro-data and 
individual company data. They consider that Chinese and Indian companies start to employ 
asset-augmenting strategy and target a wide range of created assets: technology, brands, 
distribution network, R&D facilities or managerial capabilities. Likewise, push and pull 
factors of Chinese FDI in Europe are examined by Schüler-Zhou et al. (2011). Wu (2011) 
analysed the internationalization of Chinese firms and its implications for Europe though 
Chinese enterprises have limited presence on the continent – 2% share of China’s overall 
outward FDI. Wu (2011) argues that European sophisticated technology-owning and 
innovative small firms, particularly in manufacturing sectors, remain attractive to Chinese 
companies that want to move up the technical ladder and to expand globally.  
Nicolas (2009) derives several conclusions from a study of Chinese firms in Europe. As for 
motivations, market-seeking considerations rank first and strategic-asset-seeking motivations 
second in Chinese investments. Further, through mergers and acquisitions, Chinese investors 
seek access to brands and distribution networks or to engineering know-how and customer 
networks. In contrast, greenfield investments aim to access the European market and help to 
customize products for local needs. Chinese investment in Europe is biased towards service 
activities; in manufacturing it is heavily concentrated in ICT and the automobile sector. 
Reflecting on the technology-seeking oriented nature of many Chinese investment projects in 
Europe, Di Minin et al. (2012) analyse Chinese FDI in R&D in Europe using five case studies 
of international R&D units set up by Chinese multinationals. The authors argue that R&D 
internationalization of Chinese firms is driven predominantly by learning rather than 
technological innovation. Chinese R&D units in Europe appear to evolve often from a 
strategy of pure technology exploration, over fusion of foreign technologies with R&D 
activities back home, into one of technology exploitation in foreign locations. 
Building upon the stream of literature on the effects of regional economic integration on firm 
strategies (Rugman and Verbeke 2004, Fratianni and Oh 2009), Filippov and Saebi (2008) 
and Zhang et al. (2012) examine the EU’s institutional role in the internationalization of 
Chinese firms. The EU membership of host countries entails alignment with EU norms and 
the harmonization of national laws with EU legislation, the acquis communautaire. The 
authors accentuate the single European market and the EU membership as a critical 
investment attraction factor for non-EU investors, and highlight the difference between old 
and new EU member states as investment destinations.  
Next, several studies review Chinese and Indian investments in specific European countries. 
Liu and Tian (2008) and Burghart and Rossi (2009) explore Chinese companies and FDI in 
the UK, as one of the most attractive European investment destination. Torp et al. (2011) 
studies the strategies of Chinese and Indian companies in Denmark, and De Beule et al. 
(2011) – Chinese FDI in Belgium, and Liu and Woywode (2011) – Chinese M&A in 
Germany. Pietrobelli et al. (2011) investigate the motivations of Chinese companies to invest 
in Italy and demonstrate that Chinese companies in Italy are increasingly targeting the 
acquisition of technological capabilities and of design skills and brands to tap local 
competences. They seek to link, leverage and learn from foreign acquisitions. Thus Chinese 
FDI in Italy reflects China’s strategy to increase the sophistication of its exports and to move 
away from standardized commodities and intermediate manufactures and components. 
Internationalization of Russian companies in Europe has received its share of attention too. 
Filippov (2010) traces the evolution of emerging Russian multinationals and describes the 
trends in their internationalization strategies in terms of motivations and geographical reach. 
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While many of them are active in neighbouring markets of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), Europe plays an important role in their investment strategies. 
Russia’s presence in Europe offers both challenges and opportunities. Mansilya-Kruz (2011) 
describes several types of Russian investments in Europe. Downstream integration is the 
motive for the strategic expansion into Europe of Russian commodity producers, while 
vertical integration is also a defining characteristic of the strategies in the metal mining 
sector. The strategy pursued by companies mostly active in manufacturing industries is a 
strategic asset-seeking strategy. Heinrich (2006) focuses on the presence of Russian 
companies in the old EU member states. In contrast, Kilvits et al. (2006) place the focus of 
their analysis on the new EU member states. Further, Zashev (2006) studies 
internationalization of Russian companies in the ‘newest’ EU member state Bulgaria. Pelto et 
al. (2004) draws the focus of attention to the role of Cyprus in the Russian expansion in 
Europe. Cyprus serves as a Russian bridgehead in Europe, with many Russian companies 
establishing the subsidiaries on the island, and investing via these Cypriot subsidiaries to 
other EU member states, effectively hiding their Russian origin (Kalotay 2012). 
Lastly, there are a few studies on Brazilian firms in Europe. Carvalho et al. (2010) use data 
from the Global Players Survey of emerging Brazilian multinationals. The authors conclude 
that the EU holds the second largest share of Brazil’s investment, following the South and 
Central American region. Most Brazilian companies choose to enter Europe through 
Portugal, for historical reasons having a strong cultural proximity to Brazil. An interesting 
observation is that most R&D activities carried out by Brazilian firms abroad are done in 
Europe as a primary destination, whereas North and South America are the preferred regions 
to establish manufacturing facilities. Fleury et al. (2011) address the role of Europe in the 
internationalization strategies of the ‘multilatinas’ (Latin American multinational companies). 
The authors employ a framework based on the degree of cultural and development distance 
(i.e. roughly corresponding the concept of psychic distance) to elaborate on the locational 
choices of multilatinas in Europe. Multilatinas investing in Europe for the first time choose 
overwhelmingly for Latin-Europe as opposed to Anglo-Saxon Europe. Multilatinas making 
their second or third international investment in Europe, balance them more evenly balanced 
between Latin and Anglo-Saxon Europe. The authors argue that the relatively small presence 
of multilatinas in Europe, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon region, can be attributed to cultural 
and institutional factors, while the lack of certain management (cross-cultural) competences 
plays a role too. 
To sum up, the above studies acknowledge the limited but growing presence of BRIC 
multinational companies in Europe motivated by access to technology and market. 
 
2.3. Emerging multinationals companies and investment promotion 
Section 2.1 outlined the ever increasing importance of global FDI flows and competition 
among individual states for FDI in a form of establishing IPAs. Section 2.2, in turn, 
introduced the current debate on emerging multinationals in Europe. Traditional investment 
promotion, by default, has tended to consider (and hence, attract) multinational companies 
originating from Triadic economies – Northern America, Western Europe and Japan (and 
South Korea). The rise of emerging multinationals, less sophisticated internationally and 
offering few opportunities for knowledge spillovers, forces host governments to formulate an 
FDI promotion approach towards them. 
Literature has only begun to address the implications of the emerging multinationals’ 
institutional background for the global economic order (Nölke 2011). Studies on home and 
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host government policies on emerging multinationals are scarce. Several publications address 
the role home governments of emerging multinationals (Luo et al. 2010, Moran 2008, Rasiah 
et al. 2010). However, the studies on the role of host governments are limited, with several 
exceptions. Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes (2010, 2011) examine the regulatory responses of the 
EU as a whole and individual EU member states to FDI from emerging markets, paying 
specific attention to the ‘strategic industries’, the key infrastructural sectors – 
telecommunications and energy. Although marginal in terms of volume, FDI from emerging 
markets into these two sectors has grown rapidly in recent years, with the BRIC economies 
accounting for the larger part of these flows. The study finds that the EU is still one of the 
world’s most open regimes to FDI and, though there is some evidence of protectionism vis-à-
vis FDI from emerging markets, there is also evidence of protectionism among individual EU 
member states. For example, France, Germany and Hungary have introduced additional 
screening and restrictions on FDI on the grounds of security or ‘strategic’ industries. The 
focus of Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes (2010, 2011) is mostly on acquisitions of existing firms in 
the telecom and energy sectors, and not on new greenfield investment projects, and hence no 
explicit implications for IPAs are derived.  
In contrast, several policy implications are formulated by De Beule et al. (2011) on the basis 
of review of FDI from emerging economies in Europe. Likewise, Loewendahl (2010) argues 
about a fundamental shift in the structure and activities of IPAs, reflecting the structural 
changes in the global political economy. The author identifies five key challenges in this 
respect – (1) how to promote and facilitate non-greenfield FDI, (2) how to attract FDI from 
emerging markets, (3) how to focus efforts on growth sectors in a declining market, (4) how 
to benefit from the growth of sovereign wealth funds, (5) how to attract investment from the 
diaspora – and provides conceptual reflections and calls for further research. To our 
knowledge, none of the academic (or policy-oriented) studies has conducted a thorough 
empirical research on how European IPAs actually target emerging multinationals presently.  
Our analysis of IPAs’ strategies vis-à-vis emerging multinationals departs from three basic 
policy options– negative, neutral and positive – (1) Resist, (2) Ignore, (3) Attract. The first 
option is hardly possible. It contradicts the dominant thinking of free trade and investment of 
the globalized world as well as contemporary legal frameworks promoted by WTO, 
UNCTAD, OECD, etc. Normally, all IPAs are open to all types of foreign investors. IPAs are 
mostly responsible for new, greenfield, investment projects, and not for M&A deals. And if, 
for some reasons, they decide to reject new investment projects initiated by emerging 
multinationals, the very same companies may undertake an M&A deal to enter the country. 
The second option – stay neutral – is very possible. If an IPA does not have any distinctive 
policy vis-à-vis emerging multinationals, it chooses not to target them, and treats in the same 
manner as any other foreign investor. The last option – to attract – is the most interesting 
policy response. IPAs choosing for this option reckon that the benefits brought to their 
economy by emerging multinationals will (greatly) outweigh the costs incurred, for example, 
granted investment incentives or leakage of technology from the host economy to BRIC. We 
aim to formulate a list of potential opportunities and challenges created by emerging 
multinationals. To start with, opportunities are multifaceted. 
The basis of any investment project is an influx of capital that creates jobs. Investment 
projects initiated by emerging multinationals are no different in this respect. These are 
reasons of quantitative FDI promotion are still valid, particularly in the times of economic 
hardship in Europe, when unemployment is dangerously rising. In September 2012, 
unemployment in Eurozone reached the historical maximum of 11.5%, with 25.8 million 
people in the Eurozone being unemployed. The statistics is even more dramatic for Greece – 
25.1% and Spain – 25.8% (Eurostat 2012). 
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Newly established subsidiaries of emerging multinationals can be regarded as bridges to the 
home countries of these companies. They may allow domestic firms of the host economies to 
link up with respective emerging economies. Through the presence of subsidiaries of 
emerging multinationals, domestic firms may learn to export to the dynamically growing 
markets. China’s GDP growth of 9% or India’s 7% are in stark contrast to the sluggish 
growth of 0-2% in Europe. 
Based on the above reasoning, IPAs of several European countries began to approach 
emerging multinationals and attract investors from emerging economies. In this respect, they 
achieve so-called ‘first mover advantage’. Seeing these examples of neighbouring economies 
(‘the demonstration effect’), IPAs of other countries begin to target these companies too (‘the 
domino effect’), perhaps even without a clearly formulated policy. By doing so, they join the 
competitive race for the FDI from emerging economies. Loewendahl (2010) argues that the 
competition for such FDI will only grow. Even as previous shifts in investment promotion 
have been led by a relatively small number of IPAs from the rich countries, the new shift 
towards promoting all types of investment with a much greater emphasis on emerging 
markets will be more widespread in initial adoption (Loewendahl 2010: 411). 
At the same time, threats from the presence of emerging multinationals should be considered. 
The widely spread assumption is that the major feature of emerging multinationals appears to 
be close relationship with their home country governments. The political leverage that home 
governments (may) exercise on their internationalising firms makes them tools of foreign 
policy rather than pure economic agents. The Economist (2012) warns about the rise of state 
capitalism in emerging economies (particularly China and Russia), as the spread of a new 
sort of business in the emerging world will cause increasing problems.  
Many emerging multinationals have limited international experiences on global markets 
outside of their immediate neighbourhood. They are immature in corporate governance 
(Geiger 2008) and corporate social responsibility (Hall 2008), entailing that their corporate 
structure is opaque, with less attention paid to transparency. Less emphasis is placed on 
safety of employees, and the need to comply with environmental regulations is not self-
evident. Filippov (2012) argues that Russian companies preparing for international initial 
public offering (IPOs) do improve their corporate governance, but the degree of disclosure 
strictly corresponds to the minimum IPO requirements. They are reluctant to improve 
transparency more than needed; otherwise it weakens them by exposing to a hostile 
institutional and business environment at home. In the long run, emerging multinationals are 
expected to play by the rules of the host countries; however in the short run they may still 
behave by the practices of home countries. 
Lastly, as most emerging multinationals have deficiencies in ownership advantages and 
pursue a catching-up strategy, their subsidiaries may have a lower knowledge and technology 
base than domestic firms do. Thus the potential for knowledge spillovers is missing, or very 
limited. As such, this is not a threat to host economies. Rather, this is something that IPAs 
should have in mind while negotiating about investment incentives with emerging 
multinationals. The threat is if subsidiaries of emerging multinationals acquire sensitive 
technologies in the host country. 
As this overview demonstrates, targeting of FDI from emerging economies is a controversial 
subject, with arguments both in favour and against.  
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2.4. Research propositions on BRIC investor targeting 
UNCTAD’s global survey of IPAs identifies core functions of IPAs in OECD (i.e. 
developed) and transition countries – (1) investor targeting, (2) after care programme, (3) 
consulting services. As one of the West-European IPA representatives stated in the survey,  
information-type literature and Web site; sector programmes, focus on target countries and 
companies, commitment from regions; investor services; efforts put in by country 
representatives are the most crucial tasks in attracting investment (UNCTAD 2000: 16). In 
terms of attraction of multinational companies from the BRIC countries, two elements of 
investor targeting seem to be critical – information on website and country representatives. 
On the one hand, at the dawn of the 21st century, internet is the main vehicle to transmit 
information globally, and corporate websites are important tools for investment promotion. 
On the other hand, efforts put in by country representatives in close proximity to the target 
investors remain crucial. Such investor targeting, both online and offline, is critical. 
Loewendahl (2010) notes that many firms from emerging economies are new to international 
investment. Hence, they require a much more consultative approach, from provision of 
information on market conditions to navigating in the political system of the host country. 
Multilingualism of IPA websites: The English language has emerged as a lingua franca in the 
global economy, and seemingly any executive speaks English nowadays. However, the role 
of other languages is important. Hejazi and Ma (2011) find that countries that speak the same 
language have more FDI between them. Sharing a common language with FDI partners 
enhances the ability to communicate, and hence enhances FDI between the countries (Hejazi 
and Ma 2011). The transaction costs of languages are studied by Selmier and Oh (2012) too. 
It is generally acknowledged that languages represent both a tool in international economic 
transactions and a vehicle to transmit cultural values. Cultural facility increases familiarity 
between negotiating partners, which thereby increases trust; language may simply be a 
business tool… or may additionally serve to increase trust (Selmier and Oh 2012: 190). 
Language differences drive up transaction costs, even in countries where one of the non-
English major trade languages is spoken. Selmier and Oh (2012) find that language as a tool 
is employed differently in international trade and in FDI; communication costs are much 
more important in FDI than in international trade. The reason is that international trade does 
not necessarily imply any long-term commitment, while FDI but its definition does. This is 
consistent with the Uppsala Model’ internationalization stages (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). 
Proposition 1: An IPA website in the official language of a particular emerging economy is a 
promotion effort to attract investors from this country.  
IPA global representation network: Modern information and communication technologies 
(ICT) revolutionize global knowledge flows and allow for 24×7 mode of conducting 
business. Historical and geographical divisions are becoming increasingly irrelevant in a 
global market of today. Yet, that would be naïve to think about geographical distances losing 
their significance completely. Physical proximity leading to face-to-face contacts and 
enhanced trust remains essential in business, particularly in Asian cultures. Hence, many 
IPAs establish a worldwide network of representation office, to enjoy physical proximity to 
its prospective clients. Maintenance of such global network is costly, and hence IPAs must 
optimize it – to have as few foreign offices as reasonable, but covering the most promising 
foreign financial and business centres. Traditionally, many IPAs have had their foreign 
representative offices, inter alia, in New York, California, London, Tokyo and Singapore; 
and now BRIC countries are being involved in these networks. Loewendahl (2010) argues 
that business and personal (face-to-face) networks are generally even more important in 
emerging markets than elsewhere. The business community is often closely connected to 
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certain families or schools where the future industry leaders meet, and these networks 
continue into business life. IPAs need to be able to tap into these localized networks.  
Proposition 2: Establishment and maintenance of an IPA representation office in a particular 
emerging economy is a promotion effort to attract investors from this country. 
 
3. Data, Methodology and Results 
In the next sub-section we present data and methodology and the each of the following sub-
sections will be devoted to respective research propositions. 
 
3.1. Data and Methodology 
Current 27 EU member states are included in the analysis; they are Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Belgium 
represents a special case. Due to strong federalization and political tensions between the 
federal regions, investment promotion on the federal (national) level is virtually non-existent; 
therefore the three federal regions are included in the analysis too. This weakness is noted by 
De Beule et al. (2011), arguing that Belgium’s capacity to attract Chinese investment is 
negatively affected by shortcomings in promotional and marketing efforts, particularly its 
websites that promote FDI.  
Apart from that, we include several European non-EU countries: Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (thereafter, 
Macedonia), Montenegro, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland. Croatia is an acceding country 
and it is to become the EU’s 28th member state on 1 July 2013. Three Balkan countries – 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as Iceland enjoy a formal status of EU candidate 
countries. Albania has submitted application for EU membership; and Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
regarded by the European Commission as a potential candidate. Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein are members of the European Free Trade Association (or 
EFTA), a free trade organization between these four countries that operates parallel to, and is 
linked to the EU. The EFTA states have jointly concluded free trade agreements with a 
number of other countries. Three of the EFTA countries are part of the EU Internal Market 
through the Agreement on a European Economic Area (EEA); the fourth, Switzerland, opted 
to conclude bilateral agreements with the EU. These bilateral treaties cover a wide range of 
areas, including movement of persons, transport, and technical barriers to trade. To sum up, 
the main reason for inclusion of non-EU countries in the sample is that they enjoy de facto 
the benefits of EU membership in terms of the single European market. 
IPAs of European micro-states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Mario and Vatican) and disputed 
European regions (Kosovo and Northern Cyprus) and are excluded from the analysis.  
Therefore, the complete list includes national agencies of 27 EU member states (with 3 
federal regions of Belgium) and 9 European non-EU countries. Table 1 presents a list of all 
European investment agencies included in the analysis. It is drawn primarily from the 
membership in WAIPA. In case of missing information, websites of respective IPAs were 
found using internet search engines. The analysis was conducted in mid-June 2012 and hence 
reflects the state of affairs at that period. 
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Table 1 Overview of national promotion agencies included in the analysis 
Country IPA name IPA’s URL 
Austria ABA-Invest in Austria www.aba.gv.at 
Belgium Invest in Belgium www.investinbelgium.fgov.be 
Brussels Brussels Invest & Export      www.investinbrussels.com 
Flanders Flanders Investment & Trade      www.investinflanders.be 
Wallonia Invest in Wallonia      www.investinwallonia.be 
Bulgaria InvestBulgaria Agency (IBA) www.investbg.government.bg 
Cyprus Cyprus Investment Promotion Agency (CIPA) www.cipa.org.cy 
Czech Republic CzechInvest www.czechinvest.org 
Denmark Invest in Denmark www.investindk.com 
Estonia Estonian Investment and Trade Agency www.investinestonia.com 
Finland Invest in Finland www.investinfinland.fi 
France Invest in France Agency www.invest-in-france.org 
Germany Germany Trade & Invest www.gtai.com 
Greece Invest in Greece www.investingreece.gov.gr 
Hungary Hungarian Investment and Trade Agency www.hita.hu 
Ireland IDA Ireland (Industrial Development Agency) www.idaireland.com 
Italy Invitalia www.invitalia.it 
Latvia Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (LIAA) www.liaa.gov.lv 
Lithuania Invest Lithuania www.investlithuania.com 
Luxembourg Invest in Luxembourg www.investinluxembourg.lu 
Malta Malta Enterprise www.maltaenterprise.com 
Netherlands Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency www.nfia.nl 
Poland Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency www.paiz.gov.pl 
Portugal aicep Portugal Global – Trade & Investment Agency www.portugalglobal.pt 
Romania Romania Trade & Invest www.romtradeinvest.ro 
Slovakia Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency www.sario.sk 
Slovenia JAPTI – Public Agency for Entrepreneurship and Foreign 
Investments 
www.investslovenia.org 
Spain InvestInSpain www.investinspain.org 
Sweden Invest Sweden www.investsweden.se 
United Kingdom UK Trade & Investment www.ukti.gov.uk/invest.html 
Non-EU   
Albania Albanian Investment Development Agency (AIDA) www.aida.gov.al 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of B&H (FIPA) www.fipa.gov.ba 
Croatia Connect to Croatia www.investincroatia.org 
Iceland Invest in Iceland Agency www.invest.is 
Macedonia Agency for Foreign Investments and Export Promotion www.investinmacedonia.com 
Montenegro Montenegrin Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) www.mipa.co.me 
Norway Nortrade www.nortrade.com/invest/ 
Serbia Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SIEPA) www.siepa.gov.rs 
Switzerland OSEC. Switzerland. Trade & Investment Promotion. www.osec.ch 
invest-in-switzerland.com 
 
3.2. Multilingualism and linguistic customization of IPA websites 
The first step of our analysis is to detect languages in which official IPA websites are 
available. Table 2 provides an overview of 11 most commonly used languages, classified in 
three groups – European, Asian & Arabic, and BRIC. Additionally, columns include ‘Local’ 
language, the language of the host country, if it is different from the most common five 
European languages. The last table includes other languages, seldom appearing on IPA 
websites. 
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Table 2 Multilingualism of IPA websites 
Country Local 
European Asian & Arabic BRIC Other 
EN DE FR ES IT JP KR AR CN RU BR 
Austria  ● ● ●  ● ●   ● ●   
Belgium (federal)  ●            
Wallonia  ●  ●          
Flanders  ● ● ●   ●   ●    
Brussels  ●            
Bulgaria BG ● ●           
Cyprus  ●        ● ●   
Czech Republic CZ ● ●    ● ●      
Denmark  ●        ●    
Estonia  ●            
Finland FI ● ●       ●   SE, DK 
France  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● TR 
Germany  ● ●       ●    
Greece GR ● ● ● ●    ● ● ●   
Hungary HU ● ● ● ● ●    ● ●   
Ireland  ● ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● ● TW 
Italy  ●    ●        
Latvia LV ●     ●   ● ●   
Lithuania LT ●            
Luxembourg  ●            
Malta  ●            
Netherlands  ●     ● ● ● ●  ● TW 
Poland PL ● ● ●   ● ●  ● ●   
Portugal PT ●          PT  
Romania RO ●  ●          
Slovakia SK ●     ● ● ●     
Slovenia SI ● ●           
Spain  ●   ●         
Sweden  ●     ●  ● ●  ●  
United Kingdom   ● ● ●   ●   ●    
Non-EU              
Albania SQ ●            
Bosnia-Herzegovina BS ●           HR, SR 
Croatia HR ●            
Iceland  ● ● ● ●  ●   ●   DK 
Macedonia  ●            
Montenegro  ●            
Norway  ● ● ● ●     ● ● ● DK, NL, PL 
Serbia SR ●  ●  ●     ●   
Switzerland  ● ● ●  ● ●   ● ● ●  
AR=Gulf Arabic, BG=Bulgarian, BR=Brazilian Portuguese, BS=Bosnian, CN=Chinese simplified, CZ=Czech, 
DE=German, DK=Danish, EN=English, ES=Spanish, FI=Finnish, FR=French, GR=Greek, HR=Croatian, 
HU=Hungarian, IT=Italian, JP=Japanese, KR=Korean, LT=Lithuanian, LV=Latvian, NL=Dutch, PL=Polish, 
PT=European Portuguese, RO=Romanian, RU=Russian, SE=Swedish, SI=Slovenian, SK=Slovak, SR=Serbian, 
SQ=Albanian, TR=Turkish, TW=Chinese traditional (in Taiwan). 
It comes as no surprise that English is the dominant language. All websites have an English 
version; English is either the sole language, or used in addition to the host country local 
language. Other most commonly used European languages are German, French, Spanish and 
Italian. Some 13 websites offer information in Japanese; next, Korean and Arabic are also 
popular languages, reflecting IPAs strategies to attract Japanese and Korean multinationals, 
or investors from the cash-awash Gulf region. Table 3 as such offers food for thought; 
however, the focus of our research is the BRIC economies.  
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Russian is the official language of the Russian Federation. It is also spoken in former USSR 
republics, and it is still one of the official languages of Belarus. Yet, the outward FDI from 
these economies are negligible. Therefore, we consider a Russian version of an IPA website 
as an indication of investment promotion targeting Russian firms.  
Standard Chinese is the official language of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Republic of China (ROC, also known as Taiwan), as well as one of four official languages of 
Singapore. Websites with a Chinese version often explicitly refer to China (PRC) with the 
official flag of PRC. Two IPAs – Dutch NFIA and IDA Ireland – in fact explicitly distinguish 
between Chinese and Taiwanese versions. 
The official language of Brazil is Portuguese; and it would be hard to distinguish whether a 
Portuguese version is for Portuguese or Brazilian firms. However, differences do exist 
between European (Portuguese) Portuguese and Brazilian Portuguese. Moreover, several IPA 
websites explicitly refer to ‘Brazilian Portuguese’ version, with the Brazilian national flag. 
Hence, Table 2 has a column referring to ‘Brazilian Portuguese’. 
India is an obvious methodological challenge. English is one of the official languages of 
India, and because all websites have an English version, it is hard to distinguish whether 
targeting of Indian companies is explicit or not. Thus, ‘Indian English’ is not included in the 
analysis in this section. 
Out of 27 IPAs of EU member states, 15 (more than half) have pages in Chinese, 8 (roughly 
one third) – in Russian and 5 (one fifth) – in Brazilian Portuguese. To clarify, 4 websites have 
a Brazilian Portuguese version, and one website is the Portuguese IPA using the language as 
their native. Among 9 non-EU countries, one third of websites have pages in Chinese and 
Russian, and 2 websites – in Brazilian Portuguese. 
Various combinations are visualized in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Combinations of BRIC languages 
Source: author 
 
Only two EU IPAs – IDA Ireland and Invest in France Agency – have pages in all three 
BRIC languages. Invest in France is the most multilingual IPA, as its website has pages in 12 
different languages. IDA Ireland has its website in 10 different languages. Ireland is well-
known for its openness to foreign investors; hence, the focus on the BRIC economies is 
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unsurprising. From non-EU IPAs, Swiss agency OSEC has a multilingual website (perhaps 
reflecting the multilingual Swiss identity), and the website of Norwegian Nortrade offers 
pages in different languages, including Chinese, Brazilian and Russian. However, translation 
is done online by the Google Translate service, resulting in lower than expected quality of 
translation. 
Several IPAs provide information in two BRIC languages – Chinese and Russian. They are 
Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Latvia and Poland. All these countries rely on FDI, and 
have long historic connections with Russia / USSR. Hungary, Latvia and Poland used to be in 
the Soviet bloc. The relations with Russia sometimes are strained, but all nevertheless the 
psychic distance between Russia and these counties is low. Austria used to enjoy a 
preferential position between the Western and Eastern Europe, as a bridge between the West 
and communist bloc. Cyprus is notoriously known as a destination for Russian capital flight. 
Russia and Greece enjoy excellent diplomatic relations due to the strong historical friendship 
and the deep cultural and religious ties between the two nations. These 6 countries attract 
investors from Russia, and at the same time, aim to benefit from China’s rise too. 
Combination of other two BRIC languages – Chinese and Brazilian Portuguese – is found 
only in two IPAs, in Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency and Invest Sweden. Both 
agencies look far beyond the European continent, focusing on investors from Americas and 
Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea, Gulf region, and focus on emerging markets of China 
and Brazil fits well within this strategy. However, Russian investors are not targeted. 
Russian and Brazilian Portuguese are not used solely, in isolation from other BRIC 
languages. The only exception is Serbia, Russia’s ally. Serbia Investment and Export 
Promotion Agency has a Russian version of its website. Naturally, the website of aicep 
Portugal Global is in Portuguese but this is the country’s official language. Some 6 IPAs, 
among BRIC languages, have pages only in Chinese. These are Western / Nordic European 
economies: Belgium (Flanders), Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Germany and the UK. 
Linguistic customization of IPA websites 
The next step of our inquiry is to understand whether the content offered on IPAs’ websites in 
the BRIC languages are tailor-made, or it is a mere translation of the main (English) version. 
By such customization we understand messages specifically directed to firms from the BRIC 
economies. These can be, for example, welcoming words of the representatives of the local 
diaspora (originating from the same country as the prospective investor), success stories of 
other companies from the target country, and so on. For that purpose, we only look at 
websites that have versions in BRIC languages. However, even if a web-site does not offer 
any translation to the BRIC languages, it may still contain some materials (in download 
section). 
Linguistic customization of the websites of EU IPAs is as follows. 
Austria’s multilingual website does offer customization. For example, Russian version is 
customized, presenting case studies of successful Russian investors. For Chinese investors, 
even a dedicated URL address (www.investinaustria.cn) is available. 
Belgium’s federal website is only in English; however a document in Chinese is available. 
Belgium-Wallonia’s website is only in English and French, and a few publications in other 
languages (German, Portuguese and Spanish) are available. Presentation documents of 
welcome offices – China, India, LatinAm, CEE (all in English) and Brazil (in Portuguese). 
Bulgaria’s website has only one document for BRIC– a Legal Guide, 2008 edition, in 
Russian.  
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Trilingual (English, Russian, Chinese) website of Cyprus’s IPA does not offer any 
customization. All linguistic versions are identical.  
Invest in Denmark’s website is an interesting example. It is only in English, with a mirror 
version in Chinese only, and a dedicated URL address (www.investindenmark.china.um.dk) 
Finland’s multilingual website has a Chinese version, with a dedicated URL address 
(www.investinfinland.cn). The content is the same as at the main version, however a 
newsfeed is customized for Chinese investors. 
France’s multilingual website offers customization. The Russian and Portuguese Brazilian 
versions contains PDF documents in respective languages and overviews of Russian and 
Brazilian investors, more detailed information is in English. The Chinese version is more 
extensive, with reasonable customization, e.g. success stories of Chinese companies. There is 
no customized version for Indian investors; the English version is marked as English (US). 
Germany’s website is trilingual (English, German and Chinese). The Chinese version is fully 
customized. It offers a list of successful investment projects by Chinese firms in Germany 
and various publications in Chinese. 
Greece’s website is multilingual. Each version is a direct translation of the main one. 
Ireland’s website invites the visitor to choose its locations/language. Among 11 languages, 
there are Brazil-Portuguese, Russian, Indian and Chinese. Consequently, the user is 
transferred to a website with a dedicated URL – www.idaireland.br.com, www.idaireland.ru, 
www.idaireland.in or www.idaireland.cn respectively. The Brazilian and Russian version are 
rather shallow, with only brief information in Portuguese or Russian respectively, the rest is 
in English. The Indian version is more extensive, featuring articles about bilateral relations 
and successful case studies of Indian firms in Ireland. Likewise is the Chinese, with all 
information exclusively in Chinese (unlike the Russian and Brazilian version having only a 
small part of content in respective languages). 
Italy’s IPA website is bilingual (Italian and English), but offers a brochure in Chinese.  
Latvia’s website is in several languages, but the content in Chinese is much poorer than that 
in English. In contrast, the Russian version is very comprehensive. In both versions, 
brochures for download are only in English. 
Malta’s website is currently under reconstruction. The old website is only in English. Several 
publications are available in different languages, but not in BRIC languages. 
The website of the Netherlands’ NFIA invites the visitor to select their region out of North 
America, UK & Ireland, Turkey, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Middle East, 
and China, India and Brazil. Russia is not present. The Chinese and India pages are in fact 
separate website with own URLs  www.nfia-china.com and www.nfia-india.com. Both 
web-sites are fully customized; they offer articles about bilateral relations, the lists of 
Chinese/Indian investors, investor testimonials, success stories of Chinese/Indian companies, 
sections on visa requirements are customized for nationals of China and India. The Chinese 
version provides a service of technology matching for Chinese companies wishing to come in 
contact with Dutch firms. In contrast, the Brazilian version is not a dedicated website, but 
simply a page on the main website  www.nfia.nl/brasil.html, only a few pages with general 
content are offered in Portuguese, for the rest, investors are supposed to switch to the main 
(English) website.  
Poland’s multilingual website is excellently customized. Its Chinese version opens with a 
word of welcome, highlighting economic relations between China and Poland. Further, it 
states that the Polish representative in China (whose name is even ‘translated’ to Chinese) 
‘speaks Chinese fluently and has deep understanding of Chinese culture’. News feed present 
news targeted at Chinese investors. A report prepared by KPMG Poland presents success 
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stories of Chinese investors in Poland, with a preface by an official of the Chinese Embassy 
in Poland. The Russian version is much more modest. It offers only a brief translation of the 
main (English/Polish) version. However, the Japanese and Korean versions are truncated 
version in the same manner. 
Portugal’s bilingual (English/Portuguese) website has multilingual document for download, 
including Chinese and Russian. 
Sweden’s website invites visitors to select their location. Apart from Sweden itself, North 
America, Japan, Gulf states, it is China, India and Brazil. Russia is not included. Each version 
is tailored to specific background of visitors, e.g. newsfeed about bilateral events, success 
stories of companies from the specific country, etc. The Indian version is somewhat richer 
than the Brazilian one. The Chinese version is most comprehensive though. For example, it 
features a video clip of how the Swedish government facilitated Geely’s acquisition of Volvo.  
UK’s multilingual website claims to have Spanish and Portuguese versions, but the content is 
shown in English; Russian is not available. The Chinese version is essentially a mere 
translation of the main (English) version. 
Linguistic customization of the websites of non-EU IPAs is as follows. 
Iceland’s website is multilingual. Among the BRIC languages it has only Chinese, and the 
Chinese version is a mere translation of the main (English) version. 
Macedonia’s website is only in English; however two publications in Chinese are available 
for download, dated 2009 and 2010. 
Norway’s website uses online Google translation services to translate the text of the main 
(English) version; therefore, by definition, it does not offer any customization. 
Serbia’s website is in five languages that offer essentially the same content. 
Visitors of Switzerland’s website are asked to choose their country of origin. Among them 
are Brazil, India, China, Russia, as well as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, USA. All versions 
offer essentially the same information, apart from contacts that are country-specific. 
Several conclusions can be derived.  
Firstly, customization of IPAs websites for Chinese firms is the most compressive among all 
other BRIC economies. Several website provide excellent customization tailored to Chinese 
investors by including elements such as welcoming words of officials, list of already 
established Chinese subsidiaries, newsfeed on bilateral news and events between China and 
the host country. Many have a special URL to the Chinese version, with .cn extension. 
Secondly, customization of IPA websites in Brazilian Portuguese and Russian is very modest 
in most cases, as only a front page and a few supportive pages are translated (and 
customized) for Brazilian and Russian investors.  
Thirdly, customization for Indian investors is rare. All websites are in English, and hence 
Indian investors do not have any linguistic problems. It is only IDA Ireland, Dutch NFIA and 
‘Invest in Sweden’ that have specifically tailored to Indian companies. 
Fourthly, several websites without any dedicated BRIC versions offer information booklets 
and brochures in BRIC languages. It can be seen as a first attempt to attract BRIC firms. 
However, technically it is not always successfully implemented. For example, the front, 
welcoming, page does not provide any indication of availability of these brochures. It is only 
if potential investors are really interested about investment opportunities of this specific 
country that they will explore the full website and find the files. 
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3.3. Representative offices of European IPAs in the BRIC countries 
The present section looks at the physical presence of the IPAs in the BRIC countries. 
Establishment of representation offices abroad is a costly undertaking, and may serve as a 
reliable indication of a commitment to promote the host country among investors from a 
particular economy. In some cases, IPAs have their own proprietary network; in other cases, 
they rely on the nation’s diplomatic representations. In case where resources and the current 
size of opportunity do not justify an office, IPAs are recruiting consultants to conduct lead 
generation programmes in the major emerging markets (Loewendahl 2010), but such options 
is beyond our analysis. Table 3, compiled on the basis of information from the official IPA 
websites, presents the network of European IPAs’ representation offices in the BRIC 
countries. 
 
Table 3 Representation offices of European IPAs in BRIC countries 
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Austria   ●  ●        ●       
Belgium (Flanders) ●  ●    ● ● ● ●   ● ● ●     
Czech Republic             ●       
Denmark          ●   ●       
Estonia   ● ●         ●       
Finland             ●       
France ●  ●     ●     ●       
Germany         ●     ●      
Hungary   ● ● ● ●  ●     ● ●     ● 
Ireland ●  ●      ●    ●   ●    
Latvia   ●           ●      
Luxembourg        ●     ●       
Netherlands ●       ● ●    ● ● ●     
Poland             ●       
Portugal ●  ●     ●     ● ●    ●  
Spain ● ● ●     ●     ● ● ●  ●   
Sweden ●       ●     ●       
United Kingdom ●       ● ● ● ● ●  ●   ●   
Switzerland ●  ●      ●     ●      
Total: 9 1 10 2 2 1 1 9 6 3 1 1 15 9 3 1 2 1 1 
Number of IPAs 
present in at least 
one city 
9 10 13 19 
Source: author 
 
Out of 27 EU member states, IPAs of 18 countries are present in the BRIC countries. IPAs of 
Bulgaria, Belgium (federal, Wallonia and Brussels), Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia do not have any international network and representation in 
the BRIC countries. Out of 9 non-EU IPAs, only Switzerland is present in BRIC. IPAs of 
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Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway and Serbia 
do not have any physical representation in the BRIC countries. 
Out of the 19 European IPAs having a network in BRIC, all 19 are present in China, 13 – in 
India, 10 – in Russia, and 9 – in Brazil. Shanghai, the rising star of Asia, is the most popular 
location – 15 IPAs have a representative office there; it overshadows the Chinese capital 
Beijing, with 9 offices. The Russian capital Moscow has 10 offices, the Indian capital New 
Delhi – 9, and São Paulo, the economic heart of Brazil, has 9 units too. Mumbai, the largest 
Indian city, accommodates 6 offices. The Pearl River Delta region formed by  Guangdong 
province (Guangzhou and Shenzhen) and two neighbouring Special Administrative Regions 
Hong Kong and Macau jointly has 7 offices. Interesting to note that aicep Portugal Global has 
an office in Portugal’s former colony Macau; and UK Trade & Investment is present in UK’s 
former colony Hong Kong (and not in Shanghai, for example). 
Normally, IPAs have 1-2 offices per country in the BRIC economies. Exceptions do exist 
though. UK Trade & Investment has 5 offices in India, reflecting the UK’s historic bonds 
with India. InvestInSpain possesses 4 offices in China; and apart from an office in São Paulo, 
InvestInSpain has one office in Brazil’s capital city Brasilia, as the only European IPA to do 
so. Hungarian Investment and Trade Agency has 4 offices in Russia, including Rostov-on-
Don (as the only European IPA). In China, it has three offices, two of them are unsurprisingly 
in Shanghai and Beijing, but the third one is not the Pearl River Delta region as most other 
IPAs do, but in Chongqing, a major city in Southwest China. It is identified by The 
Economist Intelligence Unit as part of CHAMPS (by the first letters of top six emerging 
Chinese cities). 
If looking at combinations several BRIC countries, six configurations of the representative 
networks in BRIC are defined (Table 4). 
  
Table 4 Configuration types of representative networks of European IPAs in BRIC 
Type Description  IPAs 
BRIC Complete BRIC 6 Belgium (Flanders), France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland 
BIC Russia is excluded 3 The Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom 
RIC Brazil is excluded 1 Hungary 
IC ‘Asia only’ 3 Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg 
RC Russia and China 3 Austria, Estonia, Latvia 
C China only 3 Czech Republic, Finland, Poland 
Source: author 
 
The first configuration type is straightforward – it is BRIC – IPAs have their offices in all 
four BRIC economies. Almost one thirds of 19 European IPAs follow this approach; they are 
all Western European countries. The BIC approach taken up by 3 Western European 
countries considers only ‘truly’ emerging economies of China and India as well as Brazil, and 
not regenerating Russia. In contrast, the RIC approach includes Asian economies and Russia, 
but not Brazil; only Hungary follows it. The ‘Asia only’ approach, with China and India is 
used by 3 Western European countries. The RC approach – Russia and China – is employed 
by two former Soviet republic and Austria that used to be bridge between the Soviet Union 
and Western Europe. The countries stay economically connected to Russia, but seek to 
explore China too. Last but not least, three countries focus exclusively on China. 
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Lastly, although not taken in our analysis, that there are significant differences in the number 
of employees working in each representation office. In many cases it can be 1 or 2 
representatives, and in certain cases the number can be up to 10 people (like in the Chinese 
and Indian offices of the Swedish IPA). What is common though is that these representatives 
are mostly natives of the host country to facilitate linguistic and cultural interaction with 
potential investors. In this respect, the case of ‘Invest in Wallonia’ (Belgium) is interesting. 
This IPA does not have any international representation network. Instead, it has a national 
(regional) network of specialized centres for BRIC investors – India Welcome Office (in 
Liege), Brazil-LatinAm Welcome Office (Arlon), China Welcome office (Mons), and 
Welcome office Central & Eastern Europe (Charleroi), served by the nationals of respective 
countries. 
 
4. Synthesis and Analysis 
Acknowledging that language is a tool in international trade and FDI and linguistic 
commonality may decrease transaction costs, we examined in depth linguistic customization 
of 39 European IPA websites. We found similarities as well as striking differences. Next, 
recognising that face-to-face communication helps overcome information asymmetry and 
enhances trust between economic agents, we studied the networks of European IPAs’ foreign 
representative offices in the BRIC countries. 
Considering BRIC countries, only three European IPAs – ‘Invest in France’, IDA Ireland and 
Swiss OSEC – have both their corporate websites in all BRIC languages and local presence 
in all four BRIC economies. IPAs of Belgium (Flanders), Portugal and Spain are present in 
all BRIC economies, but their websites do not have linguistic versions in native languages for 
all BRIC investors. Finally, Norway’s IPA aspires to offer content in all languages (through 
online Google translate), but it misses local presence in all four countries. 
Therefore, we conclude that full BRIC investor targeting is limited in Europe. Nevertheless, 
BRIC investor targeting is indeed conducted by most European IPAs, though in different 
configurations. Many European IPAs prefer to focus on two or three BRIC economies, e.g. 
China and India, or China and Russia (mostly Eastern European countries). The Balkan states 
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro) are clear outsiders in 
the ‘BRIC game’: they seemingly do not have a policy of target any BRIC investors, and 
their preferences are limited to their neighbours and traditional western European investors. 
Acknowledging that China is the incontestable champion in the BRIC group, and China is 
always present in the IPA strategies towards emerging multinationals, we analyse targeting of 
Chinese firms more thoroughly. Table 5 synthesizes both availability of information in 
Chinese online as well as physical presence of an IPA in China. 
IPAs of 14 European countries (13 EU and 1 non-EU) have a distinctive approach towards 
FDI from China: their websites provide (customized) information to Chinese investors in 
their mother tongue, and they have representation offices in China. They are mostly are 
Western European countries, ‘old’ EU member states as well as Switzerland. Additionally, 
Hungary and Poland that have relied heavily on (western) FDI in the process of their 
economic transition and became open to foreign ownership are in this group. Lastly, Latvia 
belongs to it too. Latvia’s approach to BRIC investments is ‘RC’, Russia and China; due to 
the common past and geographical proximity, it has close economic relations with Russia, 
but seemingly seeks to diversify its strategy and promote promising Chinese FDI too. 
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Table 5 European IPAs’ approach towards promoting FDI from China 
IPA website 
in Chinese 
Representative office(s) in China 
yes no 
yes 
14 : Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, Switzerland 
4 : Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Norway 
no 5 : Czech Republic, Estonia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain 
16 : Belgium (federal, Brussels, Wallonia), 
Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia  
Source: author 
 
Some 5 IPAs have local representation offices in China but their website are not customized 
for Chinese nationals. Perhaps the rationale of this approach is that personal face-to-face 
targeting of prospective Chinese investors is sufficient and does not need to be supported by 
online information. These are two new EU member states and three western European 
nations. Similarly to Poland and Hungary, the Czech Republic relied heavily on FDI in the 
process of economic transition, and hence became open to foreign ownership. Likewise, 
Estonia promotes the ideals of free and flexible economy, and openness to Chinese FDI fits 
this strategy. As for Portugal’s IPA, it does not have a full Chinese page, but one document in 
Chinese is available for download. 
IPAs of 2 EU member states – Cyprus and Greece, and 2 non-EU countries – Iceland and 
Norway – offer online content to potential Chinese investors, and yet do not have any 
physical presence in China. This can be considered as a first cheap step towards attraction of 
FDI and multinational companies from China. 
Finally, there are 16 IPAs that have opted for the ‘ignore’ policy as we hypothesized in 
Section 2.3 – they seemingly do not have any approach towards Chinese FDI. Belgium is a 
special case here; in fact Belgium-Flanders does have a clear policy to Chinese FDI, while 
Belgium-Brussels and Belgium-Wallonia don’t. Presence in this list of Italy, the only EU15 
country (‘old’ EU member state), is striking. Whilst Italy’s IPA does not have an approach to 
promote Chinese greenfield projects, there is a growing evidence of Chinese firms entering 
Italy, but by acquisitions (Pietrobelli et al. 2011). Other EU countries are new member states 
– Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. As for non-EU countries, they 
are all the Balkan states. 
Generalising, one can say that the ‘old’ EU member states display an overall positive attitude 
towards Chinese FDI as evidenced by their FDI promotion efforts. Likewise, Eastern 
European countries with strong traditions of FDI and openness to FDI tend to be positive 
about Chinese FDI. These are the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary that relied on FDI as 
the main vehicle of economic transition in the 1990s. The obtained results can be explained 
by concept of psychic distance (Section 2.1) and the perceived investment potential of the 
home government (Table 6). 
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Table 6 Rationale of promotion policies on FDI from BRIC 
Country Psychic distance Investment 
potential 
Investor targeting 
Brazil Medium. Good knowledge of Portugal, 
less knowledge on other European 
countries 
Medium Medium. Provision of general information 
on IPA websites in Portuguese, local 
representation. 
Russia Medium to Low. Good knowledge on 
Europe, especially close neighbours 
Medium Medium. Provision of general information 
on IPA websites in Russian, local 
representation. 
India Medium. Good knowledge of the UK, 
less knowledge on other European 
countries 
Medium Medium. No special content, standard 
English version of IPA, local 
representation. 
China High. Poor knowledge of Europe High High psychic distance to be overcome. 
Combined with high investment potential, 
it requires strong FDI promotion efforts 
Source: author 
 
The psychic distance between each of the BRIC countries and Europe differs, and the options 
range from high to low. On one extreme, there is the close neighbour Russia. Russian 
investors have relatively good knowledge of Europe. The new EU member states are 
considered as a home ground. The Baltic States used to be part of the Soviet Union, and other 
Eastern European economies fell under the Soviet sphere of influence. Russian companies 
became familiar with Western Europe, and many of them have (financial) operations in the 
UK.  
On the other extreme is China, experiencing very large psychical distance to Europe, being 
far away from Europe geographically, but more importantly, in cultural and linguistic terms. 
Chinese investors may lack (either specific or even general) knowledge on Europe. Further, 
there is a category of countries in between. In most cases, these are former European 
colonies. These countries have a low psychical distance to their former metropolises. As a 
rule they share the same language and many institutions are modelled on their former 
metropolises. Good examples are Brazil – Portugal and India – the UK. Emerging Brazilian 
multinationals may consider Portugal as an entry point to the common European market; and 
many Indian multinationals start their European discovery with the UK. By doing so, they 
minimize the psychic distance with other European countries. 
Looking at the statistics of outward FDI, Russia would appear at the first position, followed 
by Brazil, with India at the last place. However, perceptions of many European policy-makers 
are highly skewed towards China presently. Among all BRIC economies, currently China 
may not be the highest outward FDI producer, but with its 9% economic growth, the 
prospects look promising. 
The combination of psychic distance and (perceived) investment potential determines the 
design of investor targeting measures. Medium investor targeting may include a special 
section on the IPA’s web-site tailored to the specific emerging economy, organization of 
inbound visits, employees at IPA assigned to the specific emerging economy. In its turn, 
strong investor targeting includes technology matching with domestic firms, mobilization of 
the local diaspora of the target country’s nationals, setting up an overseas representation 
office, road-shows in the target economy and global expositions. And all of that should be 
done with the focus on long-term relationship. 
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5. Conclusions 
Previous research (Loewendahl 2010, De Beule et al 2011) has highlighted the relevance of 
European IPA’s responses to the rising flows of outward investment from emerging markets. 
Whilst the research topic is clearly defined, to our knowledge, no study presented an 
empirical overview and analysis of the current state of the BRIC investment targeting by 
national European IPAs. The present study aimed to fill this gap. 
The research was guided by a broad question of what kind of policy European IPAs should 
adopt in response to the increasing FDI flows from the BRIC economies and the rise of 
emerging multinationals. The fundamental difference with western multinationals is the 
‘Ownership advantages’. It is generally expected that host countries may benefit from unique 
competences of foreign multinationals in the form of technological spillovers. In contrast, 
many emerging multinationals internationalize in order to compensate for the lack of 
ownership advantages; and thus potential for knowledge spillovers for host economies might 
be limited. While many FDI from emerging economies are not ‘of high quality’, they cannot 
be ignored in the global FDI competition. It becomes even more relevant in the times of the 
global economic downturn. Many economies are faced with sluggish economic growth and 
rising unemployment. FDI from emerging economies may contribute to alleviating this 
problem. Our analysis investor targeting activities of 39 European IPAs gives us enough 
credibility to conclude that most of them made a positive decision in favour of promoting 
FDI from BRIC, particularly from China. 
This explorative study is only a first step in examining the interplay between the rise of FDI 
from emerging economies and national FDI policies executed by IPAs. We identify two 
directions for further research. A pertinent question is about decision-making process. 
Namely, how do European IPAs formulate their approach toward BRIC investor targeting, 
depending on the degree of their autonomy? Is it an approach coordinated with other relevant 
if governmental bodies, e.g. Foreign Ministry and Ministry for Economic Affairs? The next 
step is to assess efficiency and effectiveness of this promotion. There is a need to examine 
how the investment promotion done by the European national IPAs (and which factors 
specifically) influences the decisions of emerging multinationals concerning their locations 
plans in Europe.  
Our focus on Europe is due to its special position. On the one hand, Europe offers strong 
scientific, technological and innovative base, being an attractive place for asset- and 
knowledge-seeking investments. On the other hand, Europe is losing out to the U.S. due to 
the fragmentation of its investment promotion. Most European IPAs compete with each other 
offering the same set of advantages (or ‘unique selling points’) – the EU membership, a pool 
of highly skilled labour, good infrastructure, R&D facilities and opportunities for innovation, 
investment incentives. This competition risks to weaken the bargaining powers of individual 
European countries and lead to a downward race. While Europe aspires to be a global player 
and a top destination place for FDI, a centralized approach  ‘Invest in Europe’  is yet non-
existent, although scholars have called for its examination (Guimón 2010). 
We are confident that further research on European responses to the rise of emerging 
multinationals is a promising avenue.  
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